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We analyze the effect of means-tested benefits on annuitization decisions. Most industrialized 
countries provide a subsistence level consumption floor in old age, usually in the form of 
means-tested benefits. The availability of such means-tested payments creates an incentive to 
cash out (occupational) pension wealth for low and middle income earners, instead of taking 
the annuity. Agents trade-off the advantages from annuitization, receiving the wealth-
enhancing mortality credit, to the disadvantages, giving up “free” wealth in the form of 
means-tested supplemental benefits. We find that the availability of means-tested benefits can 
reduce the desired annuitization levels substantially. Using individual level data, we show that 
the model’s predicted annuitization rates as a function of the level of pension wealth are 
roughly consistent with the cash-out patterns of occupational pension wealth observed in 
Switzerland. 
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Virtually all industrialized countries provide supplemental retirement beneﬁts to
prevent poverty in old age. These beneﬁts are typically means-tested and eligibility
is determined both on income and assets, although in some countries only pension in-
come is taken into account. Supplemental retirement beneﬁts are an important source
of retirement provision. In OECD countries means-tested retirement beneﬁts are al-
most 22% of average earnings and approximately 17% of individuals above age 65
claim such beneﬁts (OECD (2011)).
While means-tested beneﬁts are important to reduce poverty in old age, in this pa-
per we show that the availability of these beneﬁts can substantially reduce the propen-
sitytoannuitizepensionwealthat retirement. Becausemeans-testedbeneﬁtsguarantee
a minimum income in retirement, they provide an implicit insurance against the ﬁnan-
cial consequences of longevity similar to an annuity contract. This implicit insurance
generates a strong incentiveto cash-out accumulated pension wealth at retirement even
if full annuitization were optimal in the absence of means-tested beneﬁts.
Yaari’s (1965) seminal paper demonstrated that a life-cycle consumer without a
bequest motive should choose to annuitize his entire wealth to insure longevity risk.
Davidoff et al. (2005) show that positive, but not necessarily complete annuitization
remains optimal even with market incompleteness and liquidity constraints. The case
for annuitization remains strong in the presence of bequest motives and under habit
formations. However, when international numbers are analyzed, it is apparent that
when given a choice, only a minority annuitizes voluntarily even in countries in which
the pre-existing annuitization implied by the public pension system is small. Given
the size of means-tested social insurance programs in industrialized countries, low
annuitization rates may not be that surprising.
The Swiss case nicely illustrates the incentives generated by means-tested beneﬁts
to cash out pension wealth. Maximal ﬁrst pillar beneﬁts amount to roughly CHF 2,000
per month. At the same time, there are also means-tested supplements to ﬁrst pillar
beneﬁts that lift the available income to roughly CHF 3,000 a month. An individual
with a monthly second pillar beneﬁt of less than CHF 1,000 a month, which corre-
sponds to accumulated occupational pension wealth of approximately CHF 170,000,
is always better off withdrawing the money upon retirement, spending it quickly and
then applying for means-tested beneﬁts. While the incentives are clear for individuals
1with low pension wealth and no other form of wealth, for middle-income individuals
there is a trade-off. The retiree weighs the beneﬁts from taking the lump sum, "free"
means-tested beneﬁts after withdrawal, against the disadvantages, not receiving the
wealth enhancing mortality credit and a non-ﬂat consumption pattern.
To quantify the impact of means-tested beneﬁts on the annuitization rate, we an-
alyze optimal annuity demand and consumption/savings decisions in a realistic life-
cycle model under a social security scheme in which means-tested beneﬁts can be
claimed if income and wealth fall below a certain level. The model also includes inﬂa-
tion risk and equity risk, and allows for differential tax treatments of annuity payments
versus lump sum withdrawals.
The model is calibrated to Switzerland, which is an interesting case to study for
a number or reasons. First, it combines a relatively low level of pre-existing annuiti-
zation by the ﬁrst pillar, with generous means-tested beneﬁts that exceed ﬁrst pillar
beneﬁts by roughly 50%. Second, most individuals have accumulated a large capital
stock at retirement through the mandatory occupational pension scheme. The aver-
age Swiss retiree has a capital stock of approximately CHF 300,000 to CHF 400,000
which translates into a second pillar income that approximately equals ﬁrst pillar ben-
eﬁts. Third, a relatively high fraction of individuals voluntarily annuitize their pension
wealth and there is a considerable variability of cash-out decisions against which the
theoretical predictions can be compared. Bütler and Teppa (2007) and Bütler et al.
(2011) show with micro data from pension providers that the propensity to annu-
itize increases in pension wealth, which is consistent with the incentives generated
by means-tested beneﬁts.
The main contributions of our paper are twofold. First, we ﬁnd that means-tested
beneﬁts have a sizeable impact on optimal annuitization levels. Especially for agents
with a low income and wealth level, the effect is substantial. If these retirees could not
claim means-tested beneﬁts, they would annuitizea large fraction of their second pillar
pension wealth, while the optimal annuity level is often zero when means-tested sup-
plemental income is available to them. So in contrast to previous research, we ﬁnd that
means-tested beneﬁts can provide a potential explanation for the low voluntary annu-
itization of second pillar pension wealth and ﬁnancial wealth of individuals. Second,
when comparing the observed annuity decisions of individuals regarding their second
pillar pension wealth to the optimal annuity levels, we ﬁnd a close match. Using Swiss
administrative data of occupational pension providers we see a clear pattern: Agents
2with low pension wealth levels tend to take the lump sum while agents with higher
second pillar pension wealth annuitize more often. Our life-cycle model matches this
pattern closelyandweﬁnd that means-testedbeneﬁts providean importantexplanation
for the observed annuitization behavior of individuals.
A great amount of literature has attempted to shed light on the “annuity puzzle”.
Adverse selection and administrative loads5 (Mitchell et al. (1999), Finkelstein and
Poterba (2002), Finkelstein and Poterba (2004), and Rothschild (2009)) and the exis-
tence of ﬁrst-pillar annuities (Brown et al. (2001), Dushi and Webb (2004)) can ratio-
nalizethepreference for alumpsuminsteadof an annuityincometo somedegree. Fur-
ther potential arguments against annuitization include intra-family risk-sharing (Kot-
likoff and Spivak (1981) and Brown and Poterba (2000)), incomplete annuity mar-
kets (Peijnenburg et al. (2011a)), bequest motives (Friedman and Warshawsky (1990),
Bernheim (1991), and Brown (2001)), and a desire to insureagainst expenditurespikes
(Peijnenburg et al. (2011b)).6 Nonetheless, the low observed annuitization rates re-
main hard to reconcile with economic theory. Furthermore, some recent work includes
behavioral explanations of individuals low annuitization behavior .7
Our paper relates to several studies that have examined the effect of means-tested
social insurance programs on savings and labor supply. Theoretical work by Hub-
bard et al. (1995) and Sefton et al. (2008) demonstrate that means-tested welfare pro-
grams discourage savings by households with low expected lifetime income. Em-
pirical evidence for this prediction is provided by Neumark and Powers (1998) and
Powers (1998) using U.S. data. Neumark and Powers (2000) demonstrate that means-
tested supplementaryretirement beneﬁts reduce pre-retirement laborsupply. Friedberg
(2000) ﬁnds similar evidence by exploiting changes in the earnings test rules for recip-
ients of Social Security beneﬁts in the US. However, the existing literature has largely
ignored the roleof means-tested social insurance programs on the decisionto annuitize
pension wealth. The only exception, to our knowledge, is the paper by Pashchenko
(2010) who investigates different determinants of the annuitization decision using a
simulation model parameterized for the U.S. She demonstrates that a minimum con-
5Direr (2010) explores how annuities should be taxed when facing adverse selection problems.
6See Brown (2007), for an excellent review of this literature.
7See, for example, Brown et al. (2008) who ﬁnd that people are more likely to annuitize when the
choice is presented to them in a consumption framework then when it is presented in an investment
framework. Other behavioral explanations such as mental accounting are examined in Hu and Scott
(2007) and Brown (2007).
3sumption ﬂoor reduces the participation rate in voluntary annuity markets, particularly
at the bottom of the income distribution.
Our analysis differs from thestudy by Pashchenko (2010)in several respects. First,
we explore the impact of means-tested beneﬁts while Pashchenko (2010) focuses on a
consumption ﬂoor. Both are additional income given to agents provided by the gov-
ernment, but they differ with respect to how wealth is treated and how generous the
transfer is. With means-tested beneﬁts agents are usually allowed to keep a certain
level of wealth, so means-tested beneﬁts are not reduced dollar for dollar with ad-
ditional wealth. A minimum consumption ﬂoor, on the other hand, is only paid out
after all wealth has been depleted. Furthermore, in contrast to Pashchenko (2010) we
compare actual individual level annuity choices to the predicted levels.
Contrary to most other papers on the determinants of annuity demand, our analysis
concentrates on the decision to annuitize pension wealth in fully-funded pension plans
that are either mandated or strongly favored by government regulation. These schemes
play a large role in the provision of retirement income in most industrialized countries.
Annuitization in these plans is thus a more pressing concern for public policy than in
voluntary annuity markets, which traditionally have a low annuitization rate. Further-
more, our paper is one of the few papers on annuity demand that employ individual
level data to explore determinants of annuity choices.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the life-cycle model used for
the simulations of annuitization decisions in the presence of means-tested beneﬁts.
Section 3 gives an overview of the Swiss pension system to which the model is cali-
brated and which serves as an illustration for the quantitative impact of means-tested
beneﬁts. Section 4 summarizes the data and presents descriptive statistics and Section
5 presents the results and discusses alternative interpretations of our results. Possible
policy implications will be discussed in Section 6 and Section 7 draws conclusions.
2. A life-cycle model during retirement with means-tested beneﬁts and optimal
annuitization
Means-tested supplemental beneﬁts create an incentive to cash out accumulated
second pillar wealth. If pension income is fully taken into account when calculating
the amount of means-tested beneﬁts, an annuity, even small, is detrimental to the el-
igibility for means-tested beneﬁts. If the combined income from the ﬁrst and second
pillar is below the consumption ﬂoor guaranteed by means-tested beneﬁts, a single in-
4dividual should in most cases choose the lump sum, draw it down, and then apply for
means-tested beneﬁts. While the incentives for individuals with low pension wealth
are mostly straightforward, for middle-income individuals there is a trade-off. The re-
tiree weighs the beneﬁts from taking the lump sum, “free” means-tested beneﬁts after
withdrawal, against the disadvantages, not receiving the welfare enhancing mortality
credit (longevityinsurance)and adecrease inconsumptiononce thecapital is depleted.
The effect of means-tested beneﬁts on annuitization decisions is further compli-
cated by a number of institutional details speciﬁc to a country. First, the eligibility
for means-tested beneﬁts depends on total wealth and not only on pension wealth.
Therefore, even for low levels of pension wealth, taking the annuity may be optimal
if non-pension wealth is high. Second, differences in taxation may either favor one of
the two polar options (100% annuitization vs 100% lump sum) or induce a certain split
between the two. In the Swiss case, which will serve as an illustration for the calibra-
tion, the annuity is subject to normal income tax rates, while the lump sum is taxed
only once (at retirement). Third, since annuities are typically not indexed to inﬂation,
uncertainty about future prices reduces the demand for these annuities.
In the next section, we present a life-cycle model that incorporates several impor-
tantaspectsoftheannuitizationdecision, includingmeans-testedbeneﬁts, non-pension
wealth, differential taxation of the annuity income compared to the lump sum, and a
stochastic asset return process in the presence of inﬂation.
2.1. Individual’s preferences and constraints
The analysis is for the retirement phase of the life cycle and no activedecision with
respect to the retirement timing is made. After retirement the agent faces the decision
whether to (partially) annuitize the pension wealth or take it as a lump sum. Subse-
quently lump sum taxes are levied, which is only done once, at retirement.8 For his
entire life the agent receives an annuity income from the ﬁrst and second pillar and
annual income taxes are levied on this. The agent decides optimally how much to con-
sume and, subsequently, the remaining wealth (if any) is divided optimally between
stocks and bonds. The optimal consumption and investment decisions are made annu-
ally, while the optimal choice about which fraction of the second pillar pension wealth
to annuitize takes place once, at retirement.
8In Switzerland, not only lump sum taxes are levied but also annual wealth taxes. In the analysis we
abstract from wealth taxes because these tax rates are very low and for wealth levels up to CHF 100’000
no taxes are paid.
5More formally,we examinean agent during retirement withage t = 1,...,T, where
t = 1 is the retirement age and T is the maximum age possible. Let pt denote the
probability of surviving to age t, conditional on having lived to period t−1. The indi-
viduals’ preferences are presented by a time-separable, constant relative risk aversion



















where β is the time preference discount factor, γ denotes the level of risk aversion,
and Ct is the level of date t real consumption. Nominal consumption is given by
Ct = CtΠt, where Πt is the price index at time t.
The second pillar wealth, W pw, can be transformed into an annuity income, taken





where W ls is the amount taken as a lump sum and W a is the part of the pension wealth
annuitized. The annuity income, Y II





where c is the conversion rate. The second pillar annuity income provides a nominal
income, while the ﬁrst pillar income is inﬂation protected. A tax is levied once on the
part of the second pillar pension wealth that is taken as a lump sum, τls. The lump sum
tax depends on the amount withdrawn progressively, the marginal tax rate increases
with the lump sum amount. Total net wealth at time t = 1, W1, is the sum of net
non-annuitized pension wealth plus non-pension ﬁnancial wealth, W npw:
W1 = (1 − τls)W
ls + W
npw. (4)
The income tax, τi, is progressive and levied over the sum of ﬁrst and second pillar
pension income.
The net means-tested beneﬁts Mt equal




t − rWt − gWt,0) (5)
6where ˜ Mt is the guaranteed consumption level. The applicable income to base the
amount of means-tested beneﬁts on consists of ﬁrst pillar pension income Y I
t , second
pillar pension income Y II
t , investment income (wealth times a ﬁctitious investment
return r), and a fraction g of wealth. The incomes Y I
t and Y II
t are deﬁned net of taxes.
There are two assets individuals can invest in, stocks and a riskless bond. wt is the
fraction invested in equity, which yields a gross nominal return of Rt+1. The nominal
return on the riskless bond is denoted by R
f
t . The intertemporal budget constraint of
the individual is, in nominal terms, equal to




t + Mt − Ct)(1 + R
f
t + (Rt+1 − R
f
t )wt), (6)
where Wt is theamount of ﬁnancial wealth at timet. If theagent receives means-tested
beneﬁts, his consumption is always at least as high as the guaranteed incomelevel, ˜ Mt.
The individual faces a number of constraints on the consumption and investment
decisions. First, we assume that the retiree faces borrowing and short-sales constraints
wt ≥ 0 and wt ≤ 1. (7)
Second, we impose that the investor is liquidity constrained
Ct ≤ Wt, (8)
which implies that the individual can not borrow against future annuity income to
increase consumption today.
2.2. Financial market
The asset menu of an investor consists of a riskless one-year nominal bond and
a risky stock. The return on the stock is normally distributed with an annual mean
nominal return  R and a standard deviation σR. The interest rate at time t + 1 equals
rt+1 = rt + ar(rt −  r) + ǫ
r
t+1, (9)
where rt is the instantaneous short rate and ar indicates the mean reversion coefﬁcient.
 r is the long run mean of the instantaneous short rate, and ǫr
t is normally distributed
with a zero mean and standard deviation σr. The yield on a risk-free bond with matu-










where A(h) and B(h) are scalars and h is the maturity of the bond. The real yield is
equal to the nominal yield minus expected inﬂation and an inﬂation risk premium.
We have to model inﬂation, because we examine optimal annuitization levels in
a world in which second pillar annuities are nominal. For the instantaneous expected
inﬂation rate we assume
πt+1 = πt + aπ(πt −  π) + ǫ
π
t+1, (11)
where aπ is the mean reversion parameter,  π is long run expected inﬂation, and the
error term ǫπ
t ∼ N(0,σ2
π). Subsequently the price index Π follows from





Π) are the innovations to the price index. We assume there is a
positive relation between the expected inﬂation and the instantaneous short interest
rate, that is the correlation coefﬁcient between ǫr
t and ǫΠ
t is positive. The benchmark
parameters are presented in Section 3.3.
2.3. Numerical method for solving the life-cycle problem
Due to the richness and complexity of the model it cannot be solved analytically
hence we employ numerical techniques instead. We use the method proposed by
Brandt et al. (2005) and Carroll (2006) with several extensions added by Koijen et al.
(2010). Brandt et al. (2005) adopt a simulation-based method which can deal with
many exogenous state variables. In our case Xt = (R
f
t ,πt) is the relevant exogenous
state variable. Wealth acts as an endogenous state variable. For this reason, following
Carroll (2006), we specify a grid for wealth after (annuity) income, and consumption.
As a result, it is not required to do numerical rootﬁnding to ﬁnd the optimal consump-
tion decision.
The optimization problem is solved via dynamic programming and we proceed
backwards to ﬁnd the optimal investment and consumption strategy. In the last period
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The value function satisﬁes the Bellman equation at all other points in time,
Vt(Wt,R
f
















t+1 (Rt+1 − R
f
t )/Πt+1) = 0, (15)
where C∗
t+1 denotes the optimal real consumption level. Because we solve the opti-
mization problem via backwards recursion we know C∗
t+1 at time t + 1. Furthermore
we simulate the exogenous state variables for N trajectories and T time periods hence
we can calculate the realizations of the Euler conditions, C
∗−γ
t+1 (Rt+1 − R
f
t )/Πt+1. We
regress these realizations on a polynomial expansion in the state variables to obtain an












In addition we employ a further extension introduced in Koijen et al. (2010). They
found that the regression coefﬁcients θh are smooth functions of the asset weights and
consequently we approximate the regression coefﬁcients θh by projecting them further
on polynomial expansion in the asset weights:
θ
′
h ≃ g(w)ψ. (17)




′ = 0. (18)
Due to the maximization function in the budget constraint, see (5) and (6), there
are two euler conditions for the optimal consumption level. One for when the agent














if Mt = 0, (19)
C
∗−γ










if Mt > 0. (20)
This complicates the optimization procedure for consumption and details describing
the method are in Appendix A.
3. Calibration: case study Switzerland
The availability of means-tested beneﬁts obviously reduces the demand for an
annuity. The more important question is the quantitative impact of this type of re-
insurance on the cash-out decision at retirement. To evaluate the importance of means-
testedbeneﬁts forretired individualswecalibratethemodeltotheSwisscase. Switzer-
land is an interesting case as it combines a relatively low level of pre-existing annu-
itization by the ﬁrst pillar with generous means-tested beneﬁts that exceed ﬁrst pillar
beneﬁts by roughly 50%. Moreover, most individuals have accumulated a large capital
stock at retirement through the mandatory occupational pension scheme. The aver-
age Swiss retiree can expect a second pillar income approximately equals ﬁrst pillar
beneﬁts if he annuitizes his pension wealth. At least 25% of the accumulated pension
wealth can be withdrawn as a lump sum, but most plans do not limit the fraction that
can be cashed out or apply a higher limit.
3.1. The Swiss pension system: the ﬁrst and the second pillar
Switzerland’s pension system mainly consists of two pillars, the ﬁrst pillar is a
publicly ﬁnanced pay-as-you-go scheme and the second pillar is a fully funded occu-
pational pension scheme. The ﬁrst pillar aims at providing a basic level of income to
all retired residents in Switzerland. It is ﬁnanced by government revenues and a pay-
roll tax which is proportional to labor income. Beneﬁts are strongly dependent on the
number of years contributed, but only to a limited degree on the average working in-
come. In particular, individualswhose income is high enough to qualify for the second
pillar usually get a ﬁrst-pillar income between 90 and 100 percent of the maximal ﬁrst
pillar beneﬁts. The statutory retirement age is 64 for women and 65 for men. Working
beyond age 64/65 is possible, but most work contracts specify a retirement age that
coincides with the statutory retirement age.
10The second pillar is an employer-based, fully funded occupational pension scheme
which not onlyprovides retirement beneﬁts, but also insurance in case ofdisabilityand
for survivors. The scheme is compulsory for all employees with annual earnings above
roughly CHF 20,000. Around 96 percent of working men and 83 percent of working
women are covered by an occupational pension plan. However, it does not cover non-
working individuals. As a consequence, the lowest income quartile — and thus the
individuals with the lowest life expectancy — are not or only marginally included in
these schemes.
Occupational pension plans are heavily regulated and although they typically work
as a deﬁned contribution system, far reaching income guarantees are included. In-
troduced in 1985, the main goal of the second pillar is to maintain pre-retirement
income. Including income from the ﬁrst pillar, the target replacement rate of most
pension funds is approximately 50-60 percent of insured income, corresponding to a
net replacement rate of 70-80 percent. Income above CHF 80,000 is covered by the
so-called super-mandatory part of the system. Although the employers are free to offer
super-mandatory coverage, a large majority do as occupational pensions are viewed as
an important tool to attract qualiﬁed workers in a tight labor market.
Individuals are automatically enrolled in both the mandatory and super-mandatory
partoftheplanandinmostcases donothaveanychoiceduringtheaccumulationphase
with respect to how to invest the money. Contributions to the pension plan correspond
to a certain fraction of the salary (usually 7-18 percent depending on age) of which
the employer has to pay at least half. The capital is fully portable; when an employee
starts working at another company, he receives all of the accumulated contributions
(including the employer’s part). The full sum has to be paid into the new fund.
The accrued retirement capital can be withdrawn either as a monthly life-long an-
nuity (including a 60 percent survivorbeneﬁt), a lump sum or a mix of the two options.
In some plans the cash-out limit is equal to 50 or 25 percent (the legal minimum) of
accumulated capital. Depending on the regulation of the pension the individual must
declare his choice between three months and three years prior to the effective with-
drawal date depending on insurer regulations. Many pension insurers deﬁne a default
option for the case when the beneﬁciary does not make an active choice.
Occupational pension annuities are strictly proportional to the accumulated retire-
ment assets. The capital is translated into a yearly nominal annuity using a conversion
rate. The conversion rate is independent of marital status, but depends on retirement
11age and gender. The law stipulates a minimum conversion rate in the mandatory part,
whichis currently7.05percent butwillbeloweredcontinuouslyto6.8percent in 2015.
Pension funds are requested to index pension beneﬁts to inﬂation if the ﬁnancial situ-
ation of the fund allows for this. At present, few funds are able to index pensions to
inﬂation mainly due to high liabilities created by a very high conversion factor in the
mandatory part.
3.2. Means-tested supplemental beneﬁts in Switzerland
If the total income does not cover basic needs in old age, means-tested supplemen-
tal beneﬁts may be claimed as part of the ﬁrst pillar. Like in most OECD countries,
these beneﬁts are means-tested so that only individuals whose income and assets are
below a certain threshold are eligible. In Switzerland, the value of these beneﬁts cor-
responds to 25% of average earnings, which is slightly above the average in OECD
countries of 22% (OECD (2011)).
Since the inception of means-tested beneﬁts in 1966, the fraction of the population
beyond theretirement age receiving means-tested beneﬁts has remained relativelycon-
stant at 12%. The share of beneﬁt is increasing with age which is consistent with our
hypothesisof spending down assets. In OECD countries around 17% of the population
above age 65 receives means-tested beneﬁts, although there is a considerable variation
across countries depending on how low the eligibility threshold is set. For example, in
Denmark and Australia between 70 to 80% of all retirees claim means-tested beneﬁts,
compared to less than 2% in Germany and Japan (OECD (2011)). In the United States
the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program ensures a minimum level of income
for people over age 65 as well as the disabled and blind. The beneﬁts are means-tested
and an individual can have a maximum of $2000 of total assets to be eligible.
The annual means-tested beneﬁts in Switzerland are determined by subtracting an
individual’sincomefrom theso-calledapplicableexpenditures. Formarried applicants
expenditures and income of the spouse are taken into account as well. In addition, a
child allowance is granted for each child below age 18 or until ﬁnishing schooling (at
most age 25). The income used in the calculations of means-tested supplemental bene-
ﬁts is the sum of pension income from ﬁrst and second pillars, investment income, and
earnings plus one tenth of the wealth exceeding a threshold level of CHF 25,000. The
relevant annual expenditures consist of a cost-of-living allowance, a health insurance
premium of up to an upper limit of CHF 4,500, and rent or interest payments for the
mortgage of up to a limit of 13,200 CHF. Summing up all the applicable expenditures,
12means-tested supplemental beneﬁts guarantee a gross incomeof approximately 36,000
CHF for singles.
As shown in Table B.1, average annual means-tested supplemental beneﬁts, con-
ditional on claiming, for retired beneﬁciaries in 2008 were CHF 9,600 for single ben-
eﬁciaries. The cost-of-living allowance, the health insurance premium, and rent pay-
ments are the largest categories on the expenditure side, while interest payments on
mortgages are negligible. Because the value of a home is taken into account in the cal-
culation of means-tested beneﬁts, home owners rarely qualify for means-tested ben-




In this section we set the parameter values for our speciﬁcation of the life-cycle
model, which are displayed in Table B.2. Our aim is to be as close as possible to the
Swiss case to compare the results of the simulations with actual choice. Following
related literature (Pang and Warshawsky (2010), and Yogo (2009)) we set the time
preference discount factor, β, equal to 0.96. The risk aversion coefﬁcient γ is assumed
to be 3, which is consistent with Ameriks et al. (2010). As we consider individuals
after retirement we set the time range from t = 1 to time T = 36, which corresponds
to age 65 and 100 respectively. The survival probabilities are the current male survival
probabilities in Switzerland and are obtained from the Human Mortality Database.9
We assume a certain death at age 100.
The equity return is normally distributed with a mean annual nominal return,  R,
of 6.5% (corresponding to a equity premium of 4%) and an annual standard deviation,
σR, of 20%, which is in accordance with historical stock performance. The mean
instantaneous short rate is set equal to 2.5%, the standard deviation to 1%, and the
mean reversion parameter to -0.15. The correlation between the instantaneous short
rate with the expected inﬂation is 0.4. The parameters for the inﬂation dynamics are
estimated with data from the Swiss National Bank. Mean inﬂation is equal to 1.79%,
thestandard deviationoftheinstantaneousinﬂationrate is equal to 1.12%, thestandard
deviation of the price index equals 1.11%, and the mean reversion coefﬁcient equals
-0.165.
9We refer for further information to the website, www.mortality.org.
13For old-age insurancewe calibrate the model to the Swiss case. The I pillarannuity
income, Y I
1 equals CHF 24,000 and is adjusted for inﬂation annually. This number
approximately corresponds to the average ﬁrst pillar income of individuals covered by
occupational pensions. The gross guaranteed income level to determine the means-
tested beneﬁts, ˜ Mt, is CHF 36,000 in real terms. Under this assumption the maximum
amount of means-tested beneﬁts, Mt is CHF 12,000.10 The fraction of wealth g that is
taken into account when calculating the means-tested beneﬁts is 0.1.11 The conversion
rate c that is used to translate the accumulated capital into a yearly nominal annuity
income is set to 7.2%, which corresponds to the conversion rate applied to second
pillar wealth for the period of our data. The lump sum tax τls and the income tax τY
are progressive; the exact numbers are displayed in Appendix B. The applicable tax
rates on income and lump sum payments are taken from the largest Swiss city, Zurich.
Zurich’s tax burden lies in the middle of all Swiss regions.
Table B.2
4. Data description, limitations and summary statistics
4.1. Data description
Our analysis relies on administrative records at the individual level from several
Swiss companies with an autonomous pension fund and several large Swiss insurance
companies that provide occupational pension plans for small and medium sized com-
panies. For the companies in our sample, we were given information about all employ-
ees who retired over the period 1996 to 2006. Each individual is observed only once
at retirement. The main sample consists of 23,637 men and 8,432 women. The data
contains information on the date of birth, the retirement date, annuitization decision,
amount of accumulated pension wealth, and conversion factor as well as company
speciﬁc pension scheme information such as default and cash-out options.
10The average means-tested beneﬁts actually paid out, conditional on means-tested beneﬁts being
positive, is CHF 9,600. This is less than the maximum of CHF 12,000, because in many cases only
a fraction of the maximum means-tested beneﬁts is payed out, because agents have positive pension
wealth and/or non-pensionwealth. This is similar in our simulations, were agents with a wealth level of
for instance CHF 50,000 can apply for a fraction of the maximum means-tested beneﬁts.
11We abstract from the threshold for wealth over which the fraction g is calculated, because this
would add another maximization function into the budget constraint which would complicate the nu-
merical optimization procedure even more. Furthermore, the threshold is only CHF 25,000 hence our
assumption will not change the results much.
14Since the amount of means-tested beneﬁts depends on total wealth, information
on non-pension wealth is important. This information is not recorded in the admin-
istrative data. Therefore, we utilize asset data from the ﬁrst wave of the Survey of
Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) in 2003 to estimate a distribution
of liquid an illiquid non-pension wealth, see Tables B.3 and B.4. We see that 33% of
retirees has a liquid non-pension wealth below CHF 50,000 and almost 11% of retirees
has liquid non-pension wealth over CHF 550,000. Agents are heterogeneous in non-
pension wealth and we take this into account when calculating the fraction of agents
that annuitizes their pension wealth. If an agent has for instance non-liquid non pen-
sion wealth higher than CHF 96,000, this agent will not be eligible for means-tested
beneﬁts. So we assume that 58.1% of agents is not eligible for means-tested beneﬁts
and use the corresponding optimal annuity demand. In doing so, we assume that liquid
and illiquidnon-pension wealth are independent of each other and independent of pen-
sion wealth. We calculated these correlations using the SHARE data and they are low;
the correlation between liquid and illiquid non-pension wealth is -0.01 and the correla-
tion between pension wealth and total non-pension wealth, liquid non-pension wealth,
and illiquid non-pension wealth is respectively 0.04, 0,16, and 0.14. The distributions
of liquid and illiquid non-pension wealth will be used to calculate a weighted average
of the optimal annuitization levels. Liquid non-pension wealth (NPW) corresponds to
the sum of values of on the bank accounts, government and corporate bonds, stocks,
mutual funds, individualretirement accounts, contractual savingsfor housing, cars and
life insurance policies minus ﬁnancial liabilities. Illiquid NPW is deﬁned as the sum
of the values of the primary residence net of the mortgage, other real estate, and the
owned share of own business. Total NPW is the sum of liquid and illiquid NPW.
Table B.3
Table B.4
4.2. Data restrictions and limitations
Our administrative data does not always record marital status and there is no in-
formation concerning the age or income of the spouse. Therefore, we perform the
simulation exercise for a single person household, although many retirees in our sam-
ple do not live in single person household. We are well aware of the importance of
both marital status per se and socio-economic characteristics of the spouse (in partic-
ular age and income/wealth). However, even if such data was available, we expect the
15qualitative effects to be similar for married and single men. Our data spans a time in
which wives did not work much and thus the additional pension wealth for married
men in the second pillar can be expected to be small. Moreover, the additional income
of the ﬁrst pillar for the spouse just covers the additional expenditures that are credited
against means-tested beneﬁts. Hence, for a given second pillar income, a married cou-
ple faces a very similar trade-off as a single men. Bütler and Teppa (2007) in fact ﬁnd
little difference in the annuitization rates between married and single men for those
pension funds that do provide information about marital status. The higher money’s
worth of the annuity for married individuals (due to survivor beneﬁts and higher life
expectancy) seems to be offset by a lower demand for insurance of married couples
and/or bequest motives.
We restrict the data on annuitization decisions to men only. Women are not con-
sidered in the analysis as a number of important social security reforms implemented
in recent years primarily affected women (such as an increase in the retirement age
for women from 62 to 64 and the introduction of child care credits). We would also
expect that neglecting the spousal income has larger consequences for women than
for men, thereby making the difference in decisions across (unobserved) marital status
more pronounced.
Because tax rates and tax schedules vary across Swiss cantons and municipalities,
an individual’sresidence is potentiallyimportant for theannuitizationdecision. Unfor-
tunately, this information is not recorded in the data. We therefore use data on applica-
ble tax rates on income and lump sum payments from the largest city in Switzerland,
Zurich. The tax rates are presented in Appendix B.
4.3. Summary statistics
Table B.5
Table B.5 reports key statistics for the variables of interest. Early retirement, start-
ing at age 55, as well as working beyond planned retirement is possible. However, the
average retirement age is close to the statutory retirement age of 65 for men. Average
total pension wealth is about CHF 250,000. Furthermore, we can see from Table B.5
that a large fraction of the beneﬁciaries chose a polar option, either full lump sum or
full annuity. The mean conversion rate in the mandatory part is 6.9, which is slightly
lower than what we use in the life-cycle model. The reason is that some agents retire
early and their conversion rate is lower, thereby lowering the mean conversion rate.
7.2% is the conversion rate at age 65.
16Figure B.1
Figure B.1 illustrates the relationship between the pension wealth and the annu-
itization level of pension wealth for wealth levels below 700,000 CHF. The solid line
represents the ﬁtted values from a non-parametric regression of the fraction of pension
wealth withdrawn as an annuity on pension wealth using a locally weighted regres-
sion (the bandwidth is set to 0.8).12 The average annuitization level of pension wealth
is very low for low levels of occupational pension wealth and increases continuously
for higher levels of second pillar wealth. Note that most agents choose either 100%
annuitization or 0% annuitization, hence this graph shows that the fraction of agents
that annuitizes pension wealth increases with pension wealth. Agents are heteroge-
neous in their liquid and illiquid non-pension wealth, which gives some retirees an
incentive to annuitize, while for the rest taking the lump sum is optimal. However, as
pension wealth increases, the propensity for retirees to take the annuity instead of the
lump sum increases. Furthermore, this pattern can be viewed as informal evidence that
means-tested beneﬁts affect the annuitization decision.
Given that the annuity is a normal income subject to income taxes, this additional
income increases the effective marginal tax rate under the annuity option. The lump
sum, on the other hand, is taxed only once and treated independently of other income.
As illustratedinFigureB.2, thisdifferentialtax treatmentimpliesthatthepresent value
of the lump sum’s total tax bill is almost always smaller and increases at a lower rate
that the annuity’s tax burden, especially for larger capital stocks.
Figure B.2
5. Results: the effect of means-tested beneﬁts on annuitization
First we show the optimal fraction of second pillar pension wealth taken out as an
annuityforvariouspensionwealth and non-pensionwealth levelspredicted byourlife-
cycle model and illustrate the trade-offs that retirees face due to means-tested beneﬁts.
In Section 5.3 we compare these ﬁndings with the observed annuitization decisions
concerning the second pillar pension wealth of retirees. We ﬁnd that we can match the
actual pattern of annuitization well.
12The locally weighted regression runs a separate regression for each observation in the data using
observations in the neighborhood of that observation (and giving more weight to observations close to
the observation of interest). Based on the estimate a ﬁtted value is calculated for each observation. The
line in the graph is the line through all these ﬁtted observations.
175.1. Optimal annuity demand: An illustrative example
In this section we illustrate, with a simpliﬁed model, the trade-offs that agents face
when deciding how much to annuitize. In this example we abstract from inﬂation,
equity, taxes, and non-pension wealth. Whether to take a lump sum or an annuity (or
a combination) depends on the consumption patterns that both options generate. The
optimalconsumptionlevelsiftheentirepensionwealthis annuitizedortaken asalump
sum are displayed in Figure B.3 for two different wealth levels.13 When focussing on
the graph on the left-hand side (pension wealth level of CHF 200,000), we see that
the consumption stream for the ﬁrst 10 years of retirement is much higher when the
lump sum is taken than if the pension wealth is annuitized. After that consumption
is slightly lower when the lump sum is taken compared to the full annuitization case,
about CHF 2,000 lower per year. As the annuity income that can be generated via
annuitizing all wealth (CHF 38,000), differs only to a small extent from the guaranteed
income (CHF 36,000), it is optimal to take the lump sum, consume large amounts in
the ﬁrst retirement years, and subsequently apply for means-tested beneﬁts in case the
individual is still alive.
When comparing the consumption patterns if the wealth level is CHF 350,000, we
see that, when the lump sum is taken, the consumption level is again higher for the
ﬁrst 10 years. However, after the lump sum is drawn down the difference between the
annuity income (CHF 49,000) and the guaranteed level due to means-tested beneﬁts
(CHF 36,000)is much higherfor this wealth level. Hence for this higherwealth level it
is optimal to annuitizeeverything, because beneﬁts from annuitization, a ﬂat consump-
tion pattern and receiving the wealth enhancing mortality credit, outweigh the beneﬁts
from a lump sum, receiving "free" wealth in the form of means-tested beneﬁts.
Figure B.3
5.2. Optimal annuity demand: The full model
The illustrative example above ignored inﬂation, equity, taxes, and non-pension
wealth. In this section we include step by step these important factors for annuity de-
mand and determine the optimal annuitized fraction for individuals with different lev-
els of pension wealth. Figure B.4 displays the optimalfraction of second pillarpension
13Note that the optimal consumptionstrategy is to consumethe entire annuityincome, becausein this
illustrative example we assume that the only risk that individuals face is longevity risk.
18wealth annuitized as a function of pension wealth for different levels of means-tested
beneﬁts. Inﬂation and equity risk are included, but we assume taxes and non-pension
wealth to be zero, both assumptions will be relaxed below. The dashed-squared line
is for the case where agents can not apply for means-tested beneﬁts. When pen-
sion wealth is CHF 100,000, agents optimally annuitize 50% of their pension wealth,
whereas if pension wealth amounts to CHF 600,000 the optimal fraction annuitized is
90%.
There are two other reasons why agents annuitize less than 100%.14 First, they
want to keep a certain amount liquid to invest in equity. Agents face only inﬂation
risk, but no background risk and income risk, hence the amount of risk that they are
willing to hold via the equity market is high. This generates incentives to take at least a
small part as a lump sum to increase the consumption levels in the future. Second, the
annuityisa nominalannuity,whileagentsface inﬂationrisk and prefer areal annuity.15
Figure B.4
The optimal annuity demand decreases when the means-tested beneﬁts increase.
Comparing the dashed-squared line (no means-tested beneﬁts) with the dashed-dotted
line (maximal means-tested beneﬁts CHF 12,000), we see that the optimal fraction
annuitized is lower if the government provides means-tested beneﬁts. Retirees with a
pension wealth equal and below CHF 500,000 optimally do not annuitize at all when
the maximum means-tested beneﬁts are equal to CHF 12,000. In that case agents
should optimally take the lump sum, consume considerable amounts during early re-
tirement years to draw down the lump sum, and subsequently apply for the generous
means-tested beneﬁts of CHF 12,000. The optimal fraction annuitized increases with
pension wealth, since (1) choosing the lump sum generates a less-smoothconsumption
pattern for higher levels of pension wealth and (2) the difference between the guaran-
teed income and the annuity income resulting from full annuitization increases with
the level of pension wealth. In more detail: If pension wealth is high, consumption
is really high during the ﬁrst retirement years while in later years the consumption
equals the ﬁrst pillar income plus the means-tested beneﬁts (thus a very non-smooth
14Note that 50% annuitization seems low, but this is 50% annuitized of pension wealth, not total
wealth. Agents already have more than 75% of their total wealth annuitized in the form of I pillar
annuityincome. The latter (CHF 24,000)is equivalentto a net present valueof morethan CHF 300,000.
15As expected, when runningthe simulations and excludinginﬂation risk and the possibility to invest
in equity results in optimal annuitization levels of 100%.
19consumption pattern for high pension wealth levels). However, for individuals with
such a high pension wealth, an annuity income well above the means-tested beneﬁts
can be generated. These retirees optimally take the annuity as it generates a smooth
and high consumption level over the entire lifetime. At a certain threshold the beneﬁts
from taking the lump sum, receiving "free wealth", are thus outweighed by the advan-
tage of annuitizing, a smooth consumption pattern and receiving the wealth enhancing
mortality credit.
In thepreviousresultsweabstracted fromnon-pensionwealthassumingthatagents
have zero non-pension wealth, neither liquid nor illiquid. Figure B.5 shows the effect
of liquid non-pension wealth on annuity demand. Furthermore we also include taxes,
which we previously abstracted from. By comparing the dashed-dotted line in Fig-
ure B.5 and the dashed-dotted line in Figure B.4 we can disentangle the effect of taxes.
Both graphs display the optimal annuitization levels if liquid non-pension wealth is
zero and means-tested beneﬁts of CHF 12,000 can be claimed. The only difference
between those two lines is that in Figure B.5 taxes are included. For all pension wealth
levels, the optimal annuitization levels are lower or equal for the case in which taxes
are included. Progressive rates in both the income tax (which is levied on the annuity)
and the tax on the cash-out, as well as the preferential tax treatment of the lump sum,
induce a shift towards a higher cash-out rate for a given capital stock.
Figure B.5
The main purpose of Figure B.5 is to show the effect of liquid non-pension wealth
on optimal annuity demand. The distinction between liquid and illiquid non-pension
wealth is important, since liquid wealth can be drawn down and subsequently agents
can receive means-tested beneﬁts. While retirees can not easily draw down illiquid
non-pensionwealth, such as ahouse. For thisreason almostno homeowners can apply
for means-tested beneﬁts. If agents have large amounts of liquid non-pension wealth,
they need to draw down not only the lump sum but also, on top of this, the liquid
non-pension wealth to be able to apply for means-tested beneﬁts. In Figure B.5 we
present the effect of liquid non-pension wealth on the optimal fraction annuitized. We
see that for higher levels of liquid non-pension wealth the optimal annuitization levels
rises. This is intuitive since higher amounts of liquid non-pension wealth generate
a very non-smooth consumption path over the life cycle, since retirees have to draw
down also the liquid non-pension wealth to be able to apply for means-tested beneﬁts.
20Hence, if the agent takes the lump sum, the consumption pattern in expectation is
extremely high in early years, and much lower later in life, which generates a welfare
loss.
5.3. Comparing optimal annuity demand with observed decisions
We showed in Section 4.3 that when examining the data, the fraction of individuals
who take an annuity depends positively on the amount of pension wealth. Individuals
with low pension wealth levels are more likely to take the lump sum, while individ-
uals with higher levels tend to annuitize their pension wealth. We hypothesize that
means-tested beneﬁts reduce the annuity demand in Switzerland and can explain the
annuitization pattern found in the data. In Figure B.6 we compare the empirical an-
nuitization pattern with the optimal annuitization pattern determined via the calibrated
life-cycle model.
The solid line is the ﬁtted regression line of the empirically observed fraction of
accumulated pension wealth taken as an annuity. The non-parametric regression line
illustrates the relationship between pension wealth and the fraction taken as an annu-
ity.16 Most agents either fully annuitize or take their entire pension wealth as a lump
sum. Hence the solid line presents the fraction of individuals that take an annuity for
varying pension wealth levels. The dashed line are the ﬁndings from the full life-cycle
model including the eligibility of means-tested beneﬁts.
When calculating the graph for the predicted annuity levels, we take into account
that many factors, which are heterogenous among retirees, inﬂuence the annuity deci-
sion, most importantly liquid pension wealth and illiquid pension wealth. We use the
empiricaldistributionofnon-pensionwealth, bothliquidandilliquid,fromtheSHARE
data, to calculate the propensity to annuitize for different pension wealth levels. More
precise, the graphs in Figure B.6 show the weighted average of all the optimal annuiti-
zation levels as a function of second pillar pension wealth levels, taking into account
liquid and illiquid pension wealth. The weights depend on the fraction of agents that
fall into a certain category regarding the amount of liquid and illiquid pension wealth,
assuming independency between second pillar pension wealth, liquid pension wealth,
and illiquid pension wealth.17 The distribution of liquid and illiquid pension wealth
16The solid line shows the ﬁtted values from a locally weighted regression with the empirically ob-
served fraction of pension wealth annuitized as dependent variable and pension wealth as independent
variable. The bandwidth is set to 0.8.
17For instance, 58.1% of agents has illiquid non-pension wealth above CHF 96,000, which means
21which we used to calculate the optimal annuitization pattern is displayed in Tables B.3
and B.4.
Both in the data and the model predictions, the likelihood of individuals to take
the annuity increases with pension wealth. Note that the graphs do not imply that an
individual with for instance a pension wealth of CHF 400,000 optimally annuitizes
about 30% of his pension wealth. The 30% should be interpreted as a likelihood to
annuitize averaged over all individuals with the same pension wealth. These agents
differ in their liquid and illiquid non-pension wealth and thus whether it is optimal to
annuitize or take the lump sum. When comparing the dashed line (model prediction
with means-tested beneﬁts) to the dotted line (model prediction without means-tested
beneﬁts) it is obvious that the predicted annuitization rate drops dramatically when
agents can claim means-tested beneﬁts. Comparing the optimal annuitization levels
with means-tested beneﬁts (dashed line) with the data (solid line), we ﬁnd that both
lines are remarkably close. Our calibrated life-cycle model with means-tested beneﬁts
can explain the empirically observed annuitization patterns in Switzerland well.
Figure B.6
In the data we saw that almost all agents choose either for full annuitization or
full lump sum, only 6% chooses for a mix (see Table B.5). Thus when interpreting
Figure B.6 which displays, for instance, that for agents with CHF 200,000 the average
fraction annuitized is 50%, this means that about 50% of agents choose full annuitiza-
tion and 50% choose the lump sum. We see a similar pattern for the simulations, the
number of 0/1 decisions is high, 65%. Since the annuity is nominal and agents would
like to invest in equity, slightly less than 100% annuitization can be optimal. However,
in reality individuals tend to round of numbers hence most agents choose either 0% or
100%, not for instance 90%.
that they will not be eligible for means-tested beneﬁts. Hence to calculate the propensity to annuitize
(solid line), we use the optimalannuitydemandcorrespondingto agents that can not claim means-tested
beneﬁts for this 58.1%. The independenceassumption may be questioned, but it corresponds to the fact
that the SHARE data do not show any correlation between non-pension wealth and pension wealth. A
possible interpretation of this ﬁnding is that individuals with low pension wealth may compensate by
saving more outside the second pillar. It could also be that individuals with high levels of non-pension
wealth work less and thus accumulate less pension wealth (income effect).
225.4. Alternative explanations and robustness tests
Although the data ﬁts the model’s prediction well, other explanationsmight also be
compatible with the observed annuitization pattern, most importantly differential mor-
tality. It has been documented in the literature that wealthy people tend to live longer
than less wealthy individuals (De Nardi et al. (2010)). De Nardi et al. (2010) ﬁnd a
difference of 4.6 years for a 70-year old when comparing the lowest income quintile
with the highest for the US. Since the wealthy live longer in expectation, the annuity is
relatively more attractive for them than the lump sum, compared to the less wealthy re-
tirees. This could in theory explain the observed annuitization pattern to some degree.
Unfortunately there are no data on mortality differences by pension wealth in Switzer-
land. However, it is very likely that mortality difference do not sufﬁce to explain the
cash-out pattern in Switzerland for the following reasons. First, differential mortality
is far less prevalent in European countries than in the US. Kalwij et al. (2009) ﬁnd
that the difference between 65-year old men with a low income (deﬁned as minimum
income or no income) and 65-year old men with a high income (deﬁned as two times
the median) is at most 3 years, which is substantially less than in the US. Kalwij et al.
(2009) usedata from the Netherlands, which is a country that resembles Switzerland in
terms of income distribution and health care. In addition, Kalwij et al. (2009) also ref-
erence similar studies concerning other European countries which ﬁnd a differential
of only 2 years. Reasons for the divergence between the US and Europe in mortal-
ity differences between income levels may be a more equal income distribution and
universal health care coverage in most continental European countries. Another rea-
son why differential mortality most likely can not explain the observed annuitization
pattern in Switzerland is that our data does not include the poorest individuals which
usually account for most of the mortality differential.
A crude test on the importance of differential mortality for the annuitization deci-
sion in Switzerland is to compare cash-out patterns for men and women. Longevity
differences between rich and poorindividualsare much lowerfor women than for men.
As a consequence we should observe a much steeper annuitizationproﬁle for men than
for women. Figure B.7 does not support this interpretation, although the data on fe-
male cash-out decisions suffer from the mentioned shortcomings (changes in pension
law, importance of marital status).
Figure B.7
23Pashchenko (2010) tests the implications of a consumption ﬂoor on optimal annu-
ity decisions, which is different from means-tested beneﬁts. A consumption ﬂoor is
a guaranteed income level in case the agent has no sufﬁcient income and no wealth
to be able to consume the guaranteed level. Hence the supplemental income from the
government gets reduced one-for-one with the wealth of the agent. In the US a con-
sumptionﬂoor is instated and agents can only apply for Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) if they have wealth below $2,000. In contrast, means-tested beneﬁts are more
generous, since only a fraction of total wealth is taken into account when calculat-
ing the supplemental income (In Switzerland one-for-ten reduction, since the factor
is 0.1.). Pashchenko (2010) ﬁnds that the participation level in the annuity market de-
creases for higherlevelsof theconsumptionﬂoor. Similarly, Peijnenburg et al. (2011b)
showthatthelevelofannuitizationisadecreasing functionofaminimumconsumption
level. In Figure B.8 we compare the effect of means-tested beneﬁts (dashed line) and
a consumption ﬂoor (dotted line). The propensity to annuitize is lower when agents
are offered means-tested beneﬁts compared to a consumption ﬂoor. This is intuitive
since means-tested beneﬁts are more generous than a consumption ﬂoor and thus offer
more protection against longevity risk. Hence modeling government supplements as a
consumption ﬂoor instead of means-tested beneﬁts, the latter being prevalent in most




Means-tested beneﬁts offer free longevity risk insurance to the individual. How-
ever, this can be very costly for the social insurance system because means-tested
beneﬁts create an externality on annuitization decisions. Individuals take means-tested
beneﬁts into account and annuitize a smaller fraction of their pension wealth than they
would do otherwise. In this section we quantify the costs of paying out means-tested
beneﬁts. We compare the costs of the benchmark case, (1) means-tested beneﬁts, with
alternative poverty-alleviation schemes in old age: (2) mandatory annuitization (as for
example in the Netherlands), (3) a minimum income requirement (MIR, as in the UK)
and (4) a consumption ﬂoor (comparable to the US case).
All schemeswe compareinthissection guaranteethesamegrossminimumincome
in old age (CHF 36,000 per year), but do this in different ways. As a benchmark case
24we use the Swiss scheme to which our model is calibrated. Recall that this means-
tested beneﬁts scheme does not put any restrictions on the individual’s annuitization
choice and retirees are allowed to keep a certain amount of wealth and still be eligible
for supplemental income. Furthermore, we compute the costs for the government of
mandatory full annuitization of the entire second pillar pension wealth. In that case
agents can still keep a certain amount of wealth and remain eligible for supplemen-
tal income, but they have no freedom about the fraction annuitized. Alternatively,
individuals are required to annuitize up to an amount that would guarantee a nom-
inal consumption equal to the level provided by means-tested beneﬁts. This is the
so-called minimum income requirement (MIR) which is used in the UK. To guarantee
an income equal to the state guaranteed income level, agents need to annuitize at least
CHF 167,000 of their pension wealth.18 Analogue to the previous two cases, agents
are allowed to keep a certain amount of wealth, and we assume that the rules in that
respect are similar for all three schemes. Note that for lower pension capital stocks a
minimum income requirement scheme is tantamount to mandatory full annuitization.
As a ﬁnal alternative we consider a consumption ﬂoor equal to the income guaranteed
by means-tested beneﬁts. As in the benchmark case this scheme puts no restrictions on
the cash out decision. It ensures that a retiree will always consume an amount deemed
necessary to ﬁnance a decent living, but it requires individuals to run down their entire
wealth before applying for supplemental ﬁnancial assistance.
To quantify the public costs of the different schemes we calculate the average net
present value of means-tested beneﬁts a person claims over a life time. We perform
this analysis for varying levels of pension wealth and two levels of liquid non-pension
wealth (NPW). Tables B.6 (for non-pension wealth of zero) and B.7 (NPW = CHF
200,000) show the average net present value of means-tested beneﬁts per person for
thefourpoliciesdescribedabove. AnindividualwithapensionwealthofCHF100,000
and zero non-pension wealth generates average costs of CHF 146,000 due to supple-
mental income if he can claim means-tested beneﬁts, i.e. if he is free to cash out his
entire pension wealth and is allowed to keep a certain amount of wealth liquid. For
an individual with the same wealth level, mandatory full annuitization would decrease
the net present value of costs to CHF 101,000, and the consumption ﬂoor policy would
decrease the costs to CHF 95,000. The average costs in case retirees face a minimum
18A pension wealth income of approximately CHF 167,000 generates an income of CHF 12,000,
using a conversion rate of 7.2%.
25income requirement is similar as with mandatory annuitization, CHF 101,000, be-
cause for low pension wealth levels agents are obliged to fully annuitize their pension
wealth levels. For higher pension wealth, the average costs of supplemental income
schemes are lower as the agents need to draw down more wealth before being eligible
for means-tested beneﬁts. Wealthier agents thus apply for means-tested beneﬁts at a
later age. Note that the costs for the government if means-tested beneﬁts are in place
are always higher compared to the minimum-income requirement, and that the mini-
mum income requirement is always more expensivethan mandatory full annuitization.
This is intuitive, because the wealth levels that agents are allowed to keep and still be




The difference in costs between the poverty-alleviation schemes is smaller for low
levels of pension wealth compared to intermediate levels of pension wealth. Individu-
als with low wealth levels can claim supplemental income regardless of the scheme in
place. The difference in costs for the government becomes large both in absolute and
relative terms for intermediate levels of pension wealth (CHF 200,000 to 400,000). It
then decreases for higher capital stocks as more individuals choose to annuitize vol-
untarily, and are thus less likely to claim supplemental income. With the exception of
very low levels of capital, mandatory full annuitization is the least costly policy for
the government. It ensures that individuals with intermediate and high pension wealth
levels can always care for themselves.
Figure B.7 compares the average social costs per person for an agent with CHF
200,000 of liquid non-pension wealth. As expected, the costs are substantially lower
compared to the case that an agent has zero liquid non-pension wealth. The agent
needs to draw down (most) of this liquid non-pension wealth before applying for sup-
plemental income.
It can be the case that most of the utility gains generated by the government spend-
ingarenegatedduetoexternalitiescreated bypoverty-alleviationpolicies. Forthatrea-
son, we explore the welfare differences between the four poverty-alleviation schemes
and determine whether some policies generate similar utilities but have large cost dif-
ferentials. The certainty equivalent consumption for the four schemes to alleviate
26poverty are presented in Figures B.9 and B.10. In terms of individual utility the bench-
mark policy,means-tested beneﬁts, clearly dominatesall other optionsas it (1) puts the
least restrictionsonindividualchoiceand (2) offersthemostgenerous protection(level
of transfers to retirees is the highest). Using the same argument the minimum income
requirement scheme dominates the mandatory full annuitization system. The ranking
of the consumption ﬂoor relative to the minimum income requirement and mandatory
full annuitization case is not a priori clear. Furthermore, we see that the utility from
the consumption ﬂoor scheme (with unrestricted cash-out decision) is very close to
the utility when imposing a minimum income requirement. Combining Table B.6 and
Figure B.9, we see that neither of the policies can generate similar utilities without
being also more costly, hence no poverty-alleviation policy is dominated by another.
Figure B.9
Figure B.10
We demonstrate that it is possible to provide income protection in old age at sub-
stantially lower costs than the means-tested beneﬁts scheme in place in many western
countries. This can either be achieved by using a consumption ﬂoor or requiring indi-
viduals to annuitize a certain - albeit limited - amount of their pension wealth. Both
policies impose less restriction on individual choice than mandatory annuitization and
at the same time reduce the negative externalities individuals generate by strategically
reducing the fraction of pension wealth annuitized. Lowering the costs for the gov-
ernment has large distributional consequences. It reduces the redistribution from the
wealthy to the less wealthy among the retired, but also the redistribution from the
young to the old in case the supplement income is paid out of general government
revenues.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we examine the effect of means-tested beneﬁts on optimal annuitiza-
tion decisions of individuals at retirement. Means-tested beneﬁts, which are typically
thought of as poverty protection in old age, act like an additional insurance against the
ﬁnancial consequences of longevity. They may thus induce retirees to take the lump
sum, draw it down to consume out of it, and subsequently apply for means-tested ben-
eﬁts when the lump sum is (largely) depleted. To quantify the impact of the incentive
27on the cash-out decision of an individual, we construct a rich life-cycle model in which
individuals can rely on means-tested beneﬁts in case their income is below a certain
level. The model is then calibrated to Switzerland, a country for which the incentive
is particularly strong due to a combination of a high guaranteed income and sizeable
levels of pension wealth that can be cashed out.
The results from our life-cycle model indeed demonstrate that means-tested bene-
ﬁts substantially decrease the optimal annuity demand. Not surprisingly the effect is
more pronounced for low wealth levels. If the pension wealth level is low the annuity
income generated does not differ much from (or may even be smaller than) the guar-
anteed income. Taking the lump sum, consuming out of this, and then applying for
means-tested beneﬁts generates a higher consumption level. For high pension wealth
levels, on the other hand, the annuity income is much higher than the income guaran-
teed by means-tested beneﬁts. In that case the value of the longevity insurance implied
by the annuity (also known as mortality credit) dominates the incentives of the free
means-tested supplemental beneﬁts.
Inasecondstepwecomparetheresultsfromthemodelwithobservedannuitization
behavior. Our data consists of 22,000 individual retirement decisions provided by
a number of Swiss pension funds. The predictions from the life-cycle model with
means-tested beneﬁts are close to the empirically observed annuitization pattern in
Switzerland. The optimal annuity demand not only decreases due to means-tested
beneﬁts, but also generates a pattern that is remarkably close to the data both in terms
of level and the correlation with pension wealth.
Although we derived the quantitative impact of means-tested beneﬁts on the de-
cision to annuitize for a single country, our results have further-reaching implications
for the adequacy of income provided in old age. A partial shift from ﬁrst to second
pillar income provision in old age, as discussed in many countries, has to be evaluated
carefully with respect to incentives that are created when allowing individuals to cash
out second pillar wealth. A generous protection against poverty in old age may gen-
erate a strong tendency to quickly deplete pension wealth and apply for means-tested
beneﬁts — and thus potentially high costs for the welfare system. Policy makers will
have to trade-off the beneﬁts of leaving the annuitization choice to the individuals and
the costs from doing so.
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31Appendix A. Method to determine the optimal consumption and investment de-
cisions
Appendix A.1. Summary problem
We want to optimize over consumption and asset allocation dynamically. The ex-
ogenous state variables are the risk free rate and inﬂation. The endogenous state vari-
ableiswealth. Agentsreceivemeans-testedbeneﬁts andtheamountdependsonwealth
and income.
Appendix A.2. Life-cycle optimization problem


















where β is the time preference discount factor, γ denotes the level of risk aversion, and
Ct is the real amount of wealth consumed at the beginning of period t. The probability
of surviving to age t, conditional on having lived to period t−1 is indicated by pt. We
deﬁne the nominal consumption as Ct = CtΠt and Πt is the price index. The gross
nominal equity returns are denoted by Rt and the riskless bond yields a constant gross
nominal return of R
f
t .
The budget constraint of the individual is equal to




t + Mt − Ct)(1 + R
f
t + (Rt+1 − R
f
t )wt). (A.2)
wt denotes the weight invested in stocks and Mt are the means-tested beneﬁts at the
beginning of period t. The individuals nominal consumption is indicated by Ct and
Y I
t is the after tax income from ﬁrst pillar pension wealth and Y II
t from second pillar
pension wealth. Net means-tested beneﬁts equal:




t − rWt − gWt,0), (A.3)
where ˜ Mt is the net amount of consumption/income guaranteed by the government.
If income plus return on wealth plus a fraction of wealth g is lower than ˜ Mt, agents















The timing is as follows, ﬁrst an individual receives income and (possibly) means-
tested beneﬁts, after which the individual consumes. Subsequently the remaining
wealth is invested.
The individual faces a number of constraints on the consumption and investment
decisions. First, we assume that the retiree faces borrowing and short-sales constraints
wt ≥ 0 and wt ≤ 1. (A.5)
Second, we impose that the investor is liquidity constrained
Ct ≤ Wt, (A.6)
which implies that the individual can not borrow against future annuity income to
increase consumption today. Furthermore, the agent can not save out of its means-
tested beneﬁts, but has to consume them:
Ct = min(C
∗
t , ˜ Mt) if Mt > 0 (A.7)
where C∗
t is the optimal consumption resulting from the optimization procedure.
The optimization problem is solved via dynamic programming and we proceed
backwards to ﬁnd the optimal investment and consumption strategy. In the last period
the individual consumes all remaining wealth, hence we exactly know the utility from
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The value function satisﬁes the Bellman equation
Vt(Wt,R
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33We deﬁne the portfolio return as:
R
P
t+1 = 1 + R
f
t + (Rt+1 − R
f
t )wt (A.10)
Furthermore we denote the wealth level after annuity income, consumption, and
means-tested beneﬁts as:




t − Ct + max(0,Mt) (A.11)
Appendix A.3. First order conditions
In order to ﬁnd the optimal consumption and investment decisions we derive the











































t − rWt − gWt,0) = 0 (A.14)
∂Vt
∂Wt












t − rWt − gWt,0) > 0. (A.15)
To solve for the optimal consumption, substitute (A.14) and (A.15) into (A.13) to

















t − rWt − gWt,0) = 0 (A.16)
C
∗−γ














t − rWt − gWt,0) > 0 (A.17)
Due to the complexity of the model it cannot be solved analytically. Instead we use
numerical optimizationtechniques tosolvetheproblem. Theprocedurefor theoptimal
asset allocation is described in Section 2.3 and below we elaborate on the method used
to obtain optimal consumption levels.
Appendix A.4. Optimization procedure for optimal consumption
Similar when calculating the optimal asset weights, we regress the realizations of
the Euler condition on a polynomial expansion in the state variables to obtain an ap-
proximation of the conditional expectation of the Euler condition. However, now we
calculate two potential optimal consumption levels, for both euler conditions (A.16)
and (A.17), corresponding to whether or not the agent receives means-tested beneﬁts.
Note that C∗mtb
t > C∗nomtb
t , where C∗mtb
t is the optimal consumption if an agent re-
ceives means-tested beneﬁts and C∗nomtb
t if the agent does not receive means-tested
beneﬁts. It can be see from (A.16) and (A.17) that the optimal consumption with
means-tested beneﬁts derived from the maximization procedure is always higher due
to the additional factor (1 − r − g)−(1/γ, which is always higher than 1. The means-




˜ Mt − Y I
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t − (r + g)(At + C∗mtb
t − Y I
t − Y II
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Hence for every time period and every trajectory we have a set of optimal consumption
and means-tested beneﬁts: (C∗mtb
t ,Mmtb
t ) and (C∗nomtb
t ,Mnomtb
t ). However, we need
to determine which set is the optimal set. We know that if the income level is higher
than the guaranteed consumption level, then an agent does not receive means-tested
beneﬁts and the optimal consumption level is C∗nomtb
t . In case Yt < ˜ Mt, then the
35optimal consumption result from applying the following rules:
If M
mtb
t > 0 ∩ M
nomtb





t > 0 ∩ M
nomtb





t <= 0 ∩ M
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t <= 0 ∩ M
nomtb
t > 0 ∩ |M
nomtb
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mtb





These rules are based on whether the implied means-tested beneﬁts due to the optimal
consumption level is viable. Focussing on A.20, we see that Mmtb
t > 0 and Mnomtb
t >
0. However, it should not be that the means-tested beneﬁts implied by the no-means-
tested beneﬁts consumption level are positive; Mnomtb
t should not be positive. Hence
C∗mtb
t is optimal.
Appendix B. Tax rates in Switzerland
We use the tax rates for singles, which are displayed in Table B.8.
Table B.8
36Figure B.1: Empirical annuitization levels of second pillar pension wealth
WeshowtheannuitydecisionsofretireesregardingsecondpillarpensionwealthofSwiss pensionfunds.
The dots are the decisions of individuals and the solid line is the ﬁtted values from a non-parametric
regression of the fraction of pension wealth withdrawn as an annuity on pension wealth using a locally
weighted regression.











































Figure B.2: Net present value of tax payments for the annuity and the lump sum
The taxes are discounted with a 3% interest rate and taking into account survival probabilities. Appli-

















































0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
Pension wealth (in CHF 1,000)
Tax Annuity Tax Lump Sum
37Figure B.3: Optimal consumption patterns: Illustrative example
The ﬁgure displays the consumption pattern if an individual (1) annuitized his entire pension wealth or
took the (2) lump sum. Equity, inﬂation, non-pension wealth, and taxes are excluded from the model,
the only risk that agents face is longevity risk. If the pension wealth level equals CHF 200,000 it is
optimal to choose the consumption stream corresponding to taking the lump sum while if the wealth
level is CHF 350,000 the consumption stream from full annuitization is preferred. The guaranteed
income equals CHF 36,000.
(a) wealth CHF 200,000







































(b) wealth CHF 350,000







































Figure B.4: Inﬂuence of means-tested beneﬁts on optimal annuitization levels
The ﬁgure displays the optimal annuitization levels for varying levels of means-tested beneﬁts. We
assume the agent has zero non-pensionwealth and does not pay taxes. The rest of the parameters are as
in the benchmark case.









































38Figure B.5: Inﬂuence of liquid non-pension wealth on optimal annuitization levels
The ﬁgure displays the optimal annuitization levels for varying levels of liquid non-pension wealth.
Agents can apply for means-tested beneﬁts and taxes are included. We assume the agent has zero
illiquid non-pension wealth. The rest of the parameters are as in the benchmark case






































non−pension wealth = 0
non−pension wealth = CHF 200,000
non−pension wealth = CHF 400,000
Figure B.6: Comparison optimal annuitization pattern and empirical annuitization pat-
tern
The ﬁgure displays the optimal and the empirical average fraction annuitized for varying wealth levels.
The optimal fraction is displayed for two cases: (1) assuming agents can apply for means-tested ben-
eﬁts (MTB) and (2) assuming they cannot apply for means-tested beneﬁts. The optimal fraction is the
weighted average of all the optimal annuitization levels for varying liquid-nonpension wealth and illiq-
uid non-pension wealth. Weights derived from the SHARE dataset are used, assuming independency
betweenpensionwealth, illiquidnon-pensionwealth, andliquidnon-pensionwealth. All the parameters
are as in the benchmark case.
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39Figure B.7: Comparison empirical annuitization levels women and men
All the parameters are as in the benchmark case.













































Figure B.8: Comparison of the inﬂuence of (1) means-tested beneﬁts and (2) a con-
sumption ﬂoor on optimal annuitization levels
The ﬁgure displays the optimal and the empirical average fraction annuitized for varying wealth lev-
els. The optimal fraction is displayed assuming agents can receive (1) means-tested beneﬁts or a (2)
consumption ﬂoor. The optimal fraction is the weighted average of all the optimal annuitization lev-
els for varying liquid-non pension wealth and illiquid non-pension wealth. Weights derived from the
SHARE dataset are used, assuming independencybetweenpension wealth, illiquid non-pensionwealth,
and liquid non-pension wealth. All the parameters are as in the benchmark case.











































Data − nonparametric regression
Simulation with MTB
Simulation with consumption floor
40Figure B.9: Certainty equivalent consumption for different old-age poverty alleviation
schemes, zero liquid non-pension wealth (in CHF 1,000)
All the parameters are as in the benchmark case.





























































Figure B.10: Certainty equivalent consumption for different old-age poverty allevia-
tion schemes, CHF 200,000 liquid non-pension wealth (in CHF 1,000)
All the parameters are as in the benchmark case.





























































41Table B.1: Maximum and average means-tested beneﬁts of single retired recipients in
2008
Means-tested beneﬁts correspond to the difference between applicable expenditures and income but
cover at least the health insurance premium.
Components Maximum Average
Applicable expenditures
Cost-of-living allowance 18,144 18,144
Rent/Interest on mortgage 13,200 10,212
Health insurance premium 4,500 3,996
Other expenses - 84
Total 35,844 32,436
Applicable income
First pillar beneﬁts 26,520 19,944
Other pension beneﬁts - 1,524
Wage income - 84
Own rent - 504
Investment income - 288
Wealth consumption - 636
Other income - 180
Total - 23,160
Means-tested beneﬁts 35,844 9,612
Net wealth - 20,140
Wealth (after deduction) - 6,411
Table B.2: Benchmark parameters
Description parameter value
Time preference discount factor (β) 0.96
Risk aversion coefﬁcient (γ) 3
Mean return on stocks (µR) 6.5%
Standard deviation stock returns (σR) 20%
Mean interest rate (µr) 2.5%
Standard deviation interest rate (σr) 1%
Mean reversion parameter interest rate (at) 0.15
Mean inﬂation (µπ) 1.79%
Standard deviation instantaneous inﬂation (σπ) 1.12%
Standard deviation price index (σΠ) 1.11%
Correlation interest rate and expected inﬂation 0.4
Mean reversion coefﬁcient expected inﬂation (aπ) 0.165
I pillar income at t = 1 (Y I
1 ) CHF 24,000
Guaranteed consumption level at t = 1 ( ˜ M1) CHF 36,000
Fraction of wealth taking into account to calculate MTB (g) 0.1
Conversion rate (c) 7.2%
42Table B.3: Distribution of liquid non-pension wealth
The distribution is derived using SHARE-Swiss data from 2003. We use information from all retired
men with second pillar wealth below CHF 700,000 (93 observations). The mean liquid non-pension
wealth is CHF 197,265.
liquid non-pension wealth % in wealth category
0 - 50,000 33.3
50,000 - 150,000 28.0
150,000 - 250,000 10.8
250,000 - 350,000 10.8
350,000 - 450,000 3.2
450,000 - 550,000 3.2
550,000 - 10.8
Table B.4: Distribution of illiquid non-pension wealth
The distribution is derived using SHARE-Swiss data from 2003. We use information from all retired
men with second pillar wealth below 700,000 CHF (93 observations). The mean liquid non-pension
wealth is CHF 231,987.
illiquid non-pension wealth % in wealth category
0 38.7
1 - 96,000 3.2
96,000 - 58.1
Table B.5: Summary statistics of pension funds data, men
Variable Mean Median S.D. Min Max
Age at retirement 63.9 65.0 1.8 55.0 70.7
Conversion rate
Mandatory Part 6.928 7.150 0.424 5.210 8.043
SupermandatoryPart 6.740 6.863 0.523 4.816 8.043
Pension wealth 249,797 212,591 165,387 102 699,892
Share Annuity 44.3 0 49.7 0 100
Share Lump Sum 49.9 0 50.0 0 100
Share Mixed 5.8 0 23.4 0 100
Observations 22,261
43Table B.6: Costs of the means-tested beneﬁts, non-pension wealth CHF 0
(in CHF 1,000).
The graph displays the average net present value of the means-tested beneﬁts payed out to agents. To
calculate the net present value we use the Vasicek model for the term structure of interest rates. The
non-pension wealth is liquid non-pension wealth.
pension wealth MTB mandatory full annuitization MIR consumption ﬂoor
100 146 101 101 95
200 106 24 38 51
300 77 3 20 28
400 57 0 14 12
500 44 0 11 1
600 34 0 8 0
Table B.7: Costs of the means-tested beneﬁts, non-pension wealth CHF 200,000
(in CHF 1,000).
The graph displays the average net present value of the means-tested beneﬁts payed out to agents. To
calculate the net present value we use the Vasicek model for the term structure of interest rates. The
non-pension wealth is liquid non-pension wealth.
pension wealth MTB mandatory full annuitization MIR consumption ﬂoor
100 68 40 40 23
200 50 10 14 11
300 39 2 10 3
400 30 0 8 1
500 0 0 0 0
600 0 0 0 0
44Table B.8: Tax rates for the lump-sum and income
The tax rates are for singles.
community and cantonal lump-sum tax federal lump sum tax
tax rate (in%) amount tax rate (in%) amount
4.66 up to 118500 0 up to 12600
6.99 next 41000 0.154 next 14800
9.32 next 67000 0.176 next 8500
11.65 next 82000 0.528 next 12000
13.98 next 95000 0.594 next 15000
16.31 next 109000 1.188 next 4800
18.64 next 149000 1.32 next 22100
20.97 next 286000 1.76 next 27000
23.3 next 285000 2.2 next 35900
25.63 next 449000 2.64 next 502300
27.96 next 584000 2.3 above 655000
30.29 above 2265500
community and cantonal income tax federal income tax
tax rate (in%) amount tax rate (in%) amount
0 up to 7750 0 up to 12600
4.66 next 4,100 0.77 next 14,800
6.99 next 4,100 0.88 next 8,500
9.32 next 6,700 2.64 next 12,000
11.65 next 8,200 2.97 next 15,000
13.98 next 9,500 5.94 next 4,800
16.31 next 10,900 6.6 next 22,100
18.64 next 14,900 8.8 next 27,000
20.97 next 28,600 11 next 35,900
23.3 next 28,500 13.2 next 502,300
25.63 next 44,900 11.5 above 655,000
27.96 next 58,400
30.29 above 226,550
45